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Abstract This study examines the market response to the 1999
announcement of a change in accounting for Funds from
Operations (FFO) for Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs).
This change provides an increase in transparency in the
accounting statements of REITs regarding the calculation of
FFO. An analysis of this announcement ﬁnds that shareholder
wealth increases but the signiﬁcance of that increase is
questionable. Additionally, an analysis of the adverse selection
component of the bid-ask spread ﬁnds weak evidence to support
the conjecture that the amount of information asymmetry in
REIT prices declines after the announcement of the FFO
accounting change.
On October 27, 1999, the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts
(NAREIT) announced that it amended its White Paper on Funds from Operations
(FFO) effective for implementation on January 1, 2000 (NAREIT, 1999). The
reason for this change is to increase disclosure of Real Estate Investment Trust
(REIT) activities to current and potential investors. The purpose of this article is
to examine whether this accounting change (an increase in disclosure) is priced
by the market. It examines this issue from both an investor’s perspective—
shareholder wealth—as well as from a specialist/market maker’s perspective—
the adverse selection component of the spread.
The creation of FFO as a performance measure by NAREIT in 1991 was in
response to the industry’s concern that Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) historical cost depreciation of real estate assets is generally uncorrelated
with changes in the values of depreciable assets, as historical cost deprecation
implies. The original purpose for developing FFO was to provide a capitalization
multiple similar to a P/E ratio for equity (non-REIT) based stocks.1 NAREIT
thought that the reporting of after-tax net income plus depreciation and
amortization would be useful supplemental information to measure operating
performance.242  Higgins, Ott, and Van Ness
The NAREIT announcement in 1999 indicates that an increase in disclosure
and clariﬁcation to the current calculation of FFO should beneﬁt investors.2
Speciﬁcally, FFO should include both recurring and non-recurring operating
results. The NAREIT bulletin (NAREIT, 1999, p.1) lists the following examples
of non-recurring items that should included in the calculation of FFO:
 Gains and losses on derivative and hedging arrangements;
 Costs of abandoned transactions;
 Provisions for potential loses, other than those related to depreciable
property;
 Merger integration and REIT conversion costs;
 Costs of unusual compensation or severance arrangements; and
 Debt restructuring (except those deﬁned as ‘‘extraordinary’’ under
GAAP).
Previous academic research on the informational content of FFO (prior to the
1999 NAREIT bulletin) is mixed. While, studies agree that FFO contains
information useful to investors beyond the information contained in net income
(Gore and Stott, 1998; Graham and Knight, 2000; and Stunda and Typpo, 2004),
and suggest that FFO estimates are of higher quality than net income estimates
(Downs and Gu ¨ner, 2006), the value of this additional information is still
undetermined, as several studies show that the market typically views FFO
information as marginal. For instance, Gore and Stott show that net income
contains incremental information not contained in FFO.3 Additional evidence of
incremental information not contained in FFO is provided by Vincent (1999), who
shows that FFO does not contain greater information content relative to earnings
per share, cash ﬂow from operations and earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA).
This research examines if the announcement of changes in how FFO is calculated,
as outlined in NAREIT’s 1999 white paper, is perceived to be of value by
shareholders and specialists/market makers in determining the value of REITs and
the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread for REITs. Thus, the study
is different from previous research in that the market’s perception of the change
in FFO accounting is examined. If this FFO accounting change reﬂects an increase
in information available to investors, these changes should be reﬂected in the
equity valuation of REITs.4 The research focuses on two components of the equity
valuation of REITs. First, the stock market reaction to the announcement of the
change in accounting for FFO is examined. Second, the adverse selection
component of the bid-ask spread is examined using models by George, Kaul, and
Nimalendran (1991) and Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995).5
Previous research in the accounting and ﬁnance literature ﬁnds that there is
generally not a signiﬁcant market reaction to accounting changes [e.g., Ball (1972)
ﬁnds no abnormal returns due to changes in income caused by changes in
accounting techniques and Kaplan and Roll (1972) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant abnormalThe Information Content  243
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returns associated with earnings manipulations based on changes in accounting
methods). Thus, it is likely that the change in FFO accounting should not yield a
signiﬁcant market reaction. However, if the changes in FFO accounting reduce
uncertainty about REIT valuation, the reduction of uncertainty should lead to a
positive market reaction to the announcement of the FFO reporting changes.
Although the reduction in uncertainty regarding REIT valuation in response to the
announcement of a change in FFO may or may not yield a signiﬁcant market
response, the FFO change should reduce the information asymmetry that exists
between REIT shareholders, REIT managers and market participants (investors,
traders and specialists/market makers). The typical information asymmetry model
(e.g., Copeland and Galai, 1983; and Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) suggests there
are liquidity traders and informed traders. Informed traders have information not
reﬂected in current prices and trade accordingly. Liquidity traders have reasons to
trade other than superior information. To recover the losses sustained with trading
with informed traders, market makers adjust the bid-ask spread. These models
suggest a positive relationship between the bid-ask spread and information
asymmetry.
So, with this announcement (additional disclosure of FFO information), the market
may interpret this as a signal that there is a reduction in information asymmetry.
Therefore, the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread should decrease.
Uninformed traders discover information from informed traders as informed
traders exploit their superior information by trading. Thus, uninformed traders, as
well as specialists/market markets, learn from the informed trading (Easley,
Kiefer, and O’Hara, 1996; and Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman, 1996). If
there is less information content available to the informed traders, specialists/
market makers will reduce their compensation for adverse selection in the quoted
spread, especially if the specialists/market makers view this as a positive
announcement.6
 Data and Methodology
Event Study Methodology
The sample consists of all publicly traded equity REITs that are members of
NAREIT at the time the announcement of the change in accounting policy
regarding FFO. Vincent (1999) mentions that FFO is meaningful as a performance
only for equity REITs, therefore mortgage REITs are omitted from the sample.7
Stock return information is obtained from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) database. Data for trades as well as bid and ask prices are obtained
from the New York Stock Exchange’s TAQ (Trade and Quote Database). The TAQ
database contains every trade and quote from the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX
exchanges. Using the TAQ database, all trades and quotes 30 days before and 30
days after the FFO changes are examined.244  Higgins, Ott, and Van Ness
To gauge the market response of the announcement to the change in FFO,
methodology similar to that of Schipper and Thompson (1983) is used. Traditional
event study methodology may lead to biased results when examining accounting
or regulatory changes that occur on the same day for all companies. To correct
for potential biases, Schipper and Thompson recommend using a multivariate
regression procedure to determine the abnormal returns associated with an
accounting or regulatory change. Following Schipper and Thompson, the
following model is determined:
R     R   A. (1) i , tii m , ti
Ri,t is the return on day t for REIT i, Rm,t is the return on the CRSP equally-
weighted market index and A is a dummy variable that equals one on the date of
the announcement of the change in recording funds from operations and equals
zero otherwise. Additionally, Equation (1) is estimated using the CRSP value-
weighted market index.
To account for additional systematic risk factors in REIT returns not addressed
by the simple market model of Equation (1), the market index is replaced with
the Fama and French (1993) factors. The Fama and French factors include the
market risk premium (MRP), a risk premium for size differences (SMB) and a
risk premium for book-to-market equity differences (HML). Fama and French
show that these three factors explain a signiﬁcant amount of cross-sectional
variation and stock returns. Thus, these factors should account for any systematic
risk factors not captured by a simple market model.8
In the estimation of Equation (1), returns are found for all publicly traded equity
REITs in a 100-day window before and after the announcement of the change in
recording funds from operations. While a 201-day window is used to estimate
Equation (1), only the announcement day of the FFO change is used as the event
day (A). Equation (1) is estimated in three ways: using the equally-weighted
market index, the value-weighted market index and the Fama and French (1993)
factors as controls for systematic risk. Equation (1) is estimated using the
procedure of seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). The procedure of Schipper
and Thompson (1983) is used to test the signiﬁcance of the FFO accounting
change announcement. Speciﬁcally, the sum of all event parameters is examined
to see if it is equal to zero across all ﬁrms i  0 and all the event parameters
N  
i1
are tested to see if they are jointly equal to zero (i  0, for all i).
In addition to using the SUR estimation procedure, the panel data estimation
method of Fuller and Battese (1974) is used to estimate Equation (1). The Fuller
and Battese method provides an adjustment to the standard error for both return
autocorrelation and cross-correlation amongst the returns of the different ﬁrms.The Information Content  245
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This estimation methodology is similar to the maximum likelihood estimation
performed by Schipper and Thompson (1983). Thus, the t-Statistics reported for
the coefﬁcient estimates using the Fuller and Battese estimation procedure are
complementary to the signiﬁcance tests performed using the SUR estimation
procedure. Also, Sundaram, Rangan, and Davidson (1992) note that the SUR
estimation procedure that is typically used in regulatory event studies reduces to
equation by equation Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation when the
dependent variables are identical. As this is the case in the regression model
presented here, both the SUR and Fuller and Battese methods will yield the same
parameter estimates but differ in their treatment of the standard errors. Thus, one
set of parameter estimates is reported for each estimation of Equation (1).
Adverse Selection Component Estimation
The George, Kaul, and Nimalendran Model. George, Kaul, and Nimalendran’s
(1991) (GKN) model allows expected returns to be serially dependent. This
dependence is assumed to have the same impact on both transaction returns and
quote midpoint returns. Under these conditions, the difference between the two
returns ﬁlters out the serial dependence. The transaction return is:
TR  E  (s /2)(Q  Q )  (1  )(s /2)Q  U. (2) tt q tt 1 qt t
Where Et is the expected return from time t  1t ot;  and (1  ) are the
fractions of the spread due to order processing costs and adverse selection costs,
respectively. sq is the percentage bid-ask spread, assumed to be constant through
time. Qt is a 1/1 buy-sell indicator and Ut captures public information
innovations.
GKN assume the quote midpoint is measured immediately following the
transaction at time t. As in Neal and Wheatley (1998), an upper case T subscript
is used to preserve the timing distinction for the quote midpoint. Thus, the
midpoint return is:
MR  E  (1  )(s /2)Q  U . (3) TT qTT
Subtracting the midpoint return from the transaction return and multiplying by
two yields:
2RD  s (Q  Q )  V. (4) tq t t 1 t246  Higgins, Ott, and Van Ness
Where Vt  2(Et  ET)  2(Ut  UT).
Relaxing the assumption that sq is constant and including an intercept yields:
2RD     s (Q  Q )  V. (5) t 01 qt t 1 t
As recommended by Neal and Wheatley (1998), the Lee and Ready (1991)
procedure is used to determine trade classiﬁcation. Ordinary least squares is used
to estimate the adverse selection component, (1  1), for each stock in the
sample.
The Lin, Sanger, and Booth Model. Lin, Sanger, and Booth (LSB) (1995)
developed a method of estimating empirical components of the effective spread
following Stoll (1989) and Huang and Stoll (1994). Huang and Stoll deﬁne the
signed effective half-spread, zt, as the transaction price at time t, Pt, minus the
spread midpoint, Qt. The signed effective half spread is negative for sell orders
and positive for buy orders. To reﬂect possible adverse information revealed by
the trade at time t, quote revisions of zt are added to both the bid and ask quotes.
The proportion of the spread due to adverse information, , is bounded by 0 and
1. The dealer’s gross proﬁt as a fraction of the effective spread is deﬁned as  
1    , where  reﬂects the extent of order persistence.
Since  reﬂects the quote revision (in response to a trade) as a fraction of the
effective spread Zt, and since  measures the pattern of order arrival, LSB model
the following:
Q  Q  Z   , Z  Z   . (6) t1 tt t 1 t1 tt 1
Where the disturbance terms t1 and t1 are assumed to be uncorrelated.
Following LSB, OLS is used to estimate the following equation to obtain the
adverse information component, , for each stock in the sample:
	Q  Z  e (7) t1 tt 1.
The logarithms of the transaction price and the quote midpoint are used to yield
a continuously compounded rate of return for the dependent variable and a relative
spread for the independent variable.The Information Content  247
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 Results
Event Study Results
Exhibit 1 presents the results of Equation (1) using both the SUR and Fuller and
Battese (1974) estimation procedure. Panel A contains results using the CRSP
equally-weighted market index as a control for systematic risk. Panel B contains
results using the CRSP value-weighted index as a control for systematic risk. And
Panel C contains results using the Fama and French (1993) factors as controls for
systematic risk. In all three Panels, parameter estimates are reported for the
coefﬁcients, the t-Statistics generated by the Fuller and Battese estimation and the
joint signiﬁcance tests used by Schipper and Thompson (1983) using the SUR
estimation procedure.
The abnormal returns associated with the announcement of the change in FFO
accounting vary depending on the systematic risk controls. An examination of
abnormal returns, using these different methods as controls for systematic risk—
an equally-weighted market index, a value-weighted index and the Fama and
French (1993) factors—ﬁnds abnormal returns of 0.48%, 0.30%, and 0.23%,
respectively. This decline in abnormal returns shows the importance of
appropriately controlling for systematic risk, especially when dealing with a
unique sample of ﬁrms like REITs.9
All three systematic risk controls ﬁnd that the event parameters (i) are not jointly
equal to zero across all ﬁrms and the sum of the event parameters across all ﬁrms
are not equal to zero. This implies that the abnormal returns are statistically
signiﬁcant. However, examining the results using the Fuller and Battese (1974)
procedure, reveals that the event parameters are not signiﬁcantly different from
zero (this is the case for all three systematic risk controls). The results using the
Fuller and Battese method are more robust, as this method controls for both time-
series and cross-sectional variation. Thus, there is not a signiﬁcant market response
to the announcement of the FFO accounting change.10
To further examine the hypothesis that reductions in uncertainty play a role in
driving the market’s response to the announcement of the FFO accounting change
(as well as to be thorough), changes in systematic and unsystematic risk are
analyzed around the time of the FFO accounting change. Crain, Cudd, and Brown
(2000) examine the unsystematic risk of equity REIT risk after the passage of
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993. The change in the tax law made it more
plausible for institutional investors (e.g., pension funds) to invest in REITs. The
results of this study suggest that unsystematic risk is a less signiﬁcant element of
equity REIT risk and plays a lesser role in the pricing of equity REITs with the
entry and/or anticipated entry of well-diversiﬁed institutional investors into the
equity REIT market. A similar methodology is used in the current study to248  Higgins, Ott, and Van Ness
Exhibit 1  Event Analysis Results
Panel A: Equally-Weighted Market Index




Hypothesis tests for event parameters from SUR estimation:
N
  0, for all i: F  3.07, P-value  .0001;   0: F  1.01, P-value  .3154.  ii
i1
Panel B: Value-Weighted Market Index




Hypothesis tests for event parameters from SUR estimation:
N
  0, for all i: F  3.17, P-value  .0001;   0: F  0.41, P-value  .5243.  ii
i1
Panel C: Fama and French Factors






Hypothesis tests for event parameters from SUR estimation:
N
  0, for all i: F  3.187, P-value  .0001;   0: F  0.25, P-value  .6187.  i i
i1The Information Content  249
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Exhibit 1  (continued)
Event Analysis Results
Notes: The table contains the results from the estimation of multivariate regression models to
determine the impact that the announced change in recording FFO has on the stock prices publicly
traded REITs. The estimation procedure of Schipper and Thompson (1983) is followed and he
following model estimated: Ri,t  i  iRm,t  iA; where Ri,t is the return on day t for REIT I, Rm,t
is the return on the CRSP equally-weighted (or value-weighted) market index and A is a dummy
variable that equals one on the date of the change in recording funds from operations and equals
zero otherwise. The Fama and French (1993) factors [market risk premium (MRP), size factor
(SMB) and book-to-market equity factor (HML)] are used as controls for systematic risk. Returns
are found for all publicly traded REITs in a 100-day window before and after the announcement
of the change in recording funds from operations. Estimation is done using both the SUR
procedure and the time-series cross-sectional procedure developed by Fuller and Battese (1974).
Both methods give the same parameter estimates but differ in their treatment of the standard
errors; thus, only one set of parameter estimates are reported. For the SUR estimation procedure,
a test is conducted to see whether all event parameters, i, are equal to zero across all ﬁrms and
whether the event parameters sum to zero across all ﬁrms. Panel A contains results using the CRSP
equally-weighted market index as the control for systematic risk. Panel B contains results using the
CRSP value-weighted market index as the control for systematic risk. Panel C contains results using
the Fama and French factors as controls for systematic risk.
aUsing Fuller and Battese estimation.
*Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
determine the impact that changing FFO deﬁnition has on the systematic and
unsystematic component of REIT risk. If the FFO accounting change does reduce
uncertainty, it may be expected that unsystematic risk would decrease after the
FFO accounting change announcement.
Systematic and unsystematic risk changes are examined in a 90-day window prior
to the announcement, ending 10 days before the announcement, and in a 90-day
window after the announcement, beginning 10 days after the announcement.
Standard errors and beta coefﬁcients are estimated using the SUR estimation
procedure used to calculate abnormal returns including the equally-weighted,
value-weighted and Fama and French (1993) factors as controls for systematic
risk, which produces three sets of standard errors and beta coefﬁcients.
Exhibit 2 contains the results of the comparison of REIT risk before and after the
change in FFO deﬁnition, using the three controls for systematic risk: an equally-
weighted index (Panel A), the value-weighted index (Panel B) and the Fama and
French (1993) factors (Panel C). The ﬁndings indicate that for all three systematic
risk controls, the unsystematic component of risk, as proxied by the standard error,
actually increases after the FFO accounting change announcement. This result is
interesting given the ﬁndings of Downs and Gu ¨ner (2006), which show that FFO250  Higgins, Ott, and Van Ness




Panel A: Equally-Weighted Market Index
Beta, Equally-Weighted Market Index 0.4607 0.3723 0.0884*
Residual Error 0.0136 0.0178 0.0042*
Panel B: Value-Weighted Market Index
Beta, Value-Weighted Market Index 0.2474 0.2298 0.0176
Residual Error 0.0136 0.0177 0.0041*
Panel C: Fama and French Factors
Beta, MRP 0.4022 0.4588 0.0566
Beta, SMB 0.2836 0.1458 0.1377*
Beta, HML 0.1609 0.4604 0.2995*
Residual Error 0.0135 0.0175 0.0040*
Notes: The table examines changes in systematic and unsystematic risk around the announcement
of the change in recording funds from operations for REITs. Systematic risk is deﬁned as the beta
of the REIT relative to the CRSP equally-weighted market index, the beta of the REIT relative to the
CRSP value-weighted index, or the betas of the REIT relative to the Fama and French (1993)
factors [market risk premium (MRP), size factor (SMB) and book-to-market equity factor (HML)].
Unsystematic risk is deﬁned as the residuals from the estimation of the systematic risk models.
Betas and residual errors are estimated using the SUR procedure for all publicly traded REITs in
the 90-day window starting 10 days before the announcement of the change in recording funds
from operations and in the 90-day window starting 10 days after the announcement. Differences
are tested using a standard t-Statistic. Panel A contains results using the equally-weighted market
index as the systematic risk factor. Panel B contains results using the value-weighted market index
as the systematic risk factor. Panel C contains results using Fama and French factors as systematic
risk factors.
*Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
forecasts exceed the quality of net income forecasts. Thus, this increase in
systematic risk suggests that the FFO accounting change actually reduced the
quality of information contained in FFO. The equally-weighted index beta, and
the Fama and French market factor, decrease after the FFO accounting change
while the Fama and French book-to-market equity factor increases after the FFO
accounting change announcement. These results would seem to imply that the
changes in FFO accounting actually increase uncertainty in REIT returns. The
change in systematic risk factors could possibly be related to the change in FFO
accounting but is more likely associated with external market factors.The Information Content  251
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Exhibit 3  Estimation of Adverse Selection Models
Model







Panel A: Adverse Selection Components for REITs
GKN 0.4684 0.4508 0.0176 3.1321*
LSB 0.3608 0.3047 0.0561 2.6268*
Panel B: Adverse Selection Components for Market-Value Matched Sample
GKN 0.4178 0.4212 0.0034 0.4485
LSB 0.4158 0.3870 0.0288 1.1491
Panel C: Difference Between REIT and Matched Sample Adverse Selection Component Changes






Notes: The table contains the estimation of the adverse selection component of bid-ask spread. In
order to determine if changing recording requirements for funds from operations reduced
information asymmetry for REITs, adverse selection components are estimated 30 days before and
after the announcement of the change in recording funds from operations. Additionally, the
adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread is examined for a market-value matched
sample of ﬁrms to determine if any change in the adverse selection component was systemic to the
market as a whole. Two different models, the George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (GKN) (1991)
model and the Lin, Sanger, and Booth (LSB) (1995) model, are used to estimate the adverse
selection component. Panel A contains the results of the estimation for REITs. Panel B contains the
results of the estimation for the market-value matching sample. Panel C contains the paired
differences between the REITs and their corresponding matched ﬁrms.
*Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Adverse Selection Component Estimation
Exhibit 3 examines the results of the estimation of the GKN and LSB adverse
selection component models.11 These two models are estimated for all REITs and
a matching sample of ﬁrms of similar market capitalization. Thus, changes in the
adverse selection component of the spread for REIT ﬁrms can be examined to see
they are systematic to the market as a whole. Panel A contains the adverse
selection component estimation for REIT ﬁrms. Panel B contains adverse selection252  Higgins, Ott, and Van Ness
component estimation for the market-value matched ﬁrms. And Panel C contains
the difference between the REIT ﬁrm’s adverse selection component changes and
its corresponding matching ﬁrm’s adverse selection component changes.12
As can be seen, both the GKN and LSB models show a signiﬁcant decrease in
the adverse selection component of the spread in the post-announcement time
period. This implies that the change in FFO accounting decreases information
asymmetry in REIT ﬁrms. An examination of adverse selection of the spread for
the matched ﬁrms ﬁnds that there is no signiﬁcant change in the adverse selection
component. However, when examining the paired difference between REIT ﬁrms
and their corresponding matching ﬁrms, there are mixed results regarding the
signiﬁcance of the decline in the adverse selection component for the REIT ﬁrms
relative to their corresponding matched ﬁrms. For the GKN model, the change in
the REIT ﬁrm’s adverse selection component is signiﬁcantly less than the change
in the matched ﬁrm’s adverse selection component. However, when examining the
LSB model, there is no signiﬁcant difference in the changes in adverse selection
component pre and post FFO accounting change for REIT ﬁrms and their matched
ﬁrms. Therefore, it appears that the announcement of the change in FFO
accounting provides weak evidence regarding changes in the adverse selection
component of the bid-ask spread by specialists and market makers.
 Conclusion
This paper examines the impact that the announcement of the 1999 change in
accounting for FFO proposed by NAREIT has on REIT valuation. While
accounting changes generally do not provide information to market participants,
the accounting change should increase the usefulness of FFO as a valuation metric.
This increase in usefulness may lead to a reduction in the uncertainty in the
valuation of REITs. This reduction of uncertainty could be value enhancing for
REIT investors. The ﬁndings indicated that there is limited evidence of a
signiﬁcant market reaction to the announcement of the change in FFO accounting.
Additionally, the ﬁndings reveal an increase in unsystematic risk associated with
the FFO accounting change announcement. There is also some evidence of a
decline in the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread for REIT ﬁrms
after the announcement of the FFO accounting change. Therefore, the
announcement of the change in FFO accounting does not provide any signiﬁcant
information to market participants about the value of REITs, although there is
weak evidence that specialists and market makers view this as information and
reduce the adverse selection component of the spread.
 Endnotes
1 It is suggested that comparison of operating results of REITs that rely on GAAP net
income is unsatisfactory and that measuring prices of REIT stocks solely in terms of
convention P/E (Price/Earnings) is not meaningful.The Information Content  253
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2 Although this increase in disclosure is not mandatory, publicly traded REITs historically
follow NAREIT’s suggestions.
3 Gore and Stott (1998) show that the gain/loss from the sale of investments, which is
not contained in FFO, does add incremental information useful to investors.
4 If there is no change in the value of the REIT, or no change in the adverse selection
component of the spread, it is assumed that there is no signiﬁcant information content
contained in the FFO accounting change [this ﬁnding would be consistent with the Gore
and Stott (1998), Vincent (1999), and Graham and Knight (2000)].
5 Previous research regarding FFO has not examined spread decomposition, which is an
analysis of market maker/specialist behavior.
6 Kim and Verrecchia (1994) examine this type of behavior surrounding earnings releases
and suggest that market makers increase the bid-ask spread to protect themselves from
the temporary information advantage held by informed market participants.
7 Mortgage REITs do not have to deal with depreciation; thus, net income and FFO are
essentially the same measure for mortgage REITs.
8 Data for the Fama and French (1993) was obtained from Kenneth French’s (2003)
website.
9 This is corroborated with the ﬁndings of Chiang, Lee, and Wisen (2004). The authors
state that the relationship between the returns of REITs and the market return are
dependent on model selection.
10 It is not surprising to ﬁnding conﬂicting results with these two methods given the
differing methodology, as well as the ﬁndings regarding the Asymmetric REIT-Beta
Puzzle (Chatrath, Liang, and McIntosh, 2000; and Chiang, Lee, and Wisen, 2004) and
REIT systematic risk sensitivity (Allen, Madura, and Springer, 2000; Conover, Friday
and Howton, 2000; and Delcoure and Dickens, 2004).
11 The spread decomposition method of GKN and LSB is used as opposed to other
methods, as Van Ness, Van Ness, and Warr (2001) show that these methods produce
adverse selection estimates more consistent with expectations than other spread
decomposition models.
12 Matches are based upon market capitalization, as Bessembinder (2003) states that
matching upon market capitalization versus other matching methods does not tend to
change empirical ﬁndings. Additionally, LaPlante and Muscarella (1997) investigate
several matching techniques and report that their results are not sensitive to the use of
alternative matching techniques.
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